Lacan Le-sinthome


by Lorenzo Chiesa

In the name of Freud... and of Lacan!

In *Seminar III*, Lacan reminds us of three peculiar characteristics regarding the name of the-father-of-psychoanalysis which usually pass unnoticed: 1) "Freud" is a name that, owing to an Hapsburg imperial edict, had to be "chosen" by Freud's Jewish ancestors to replace their own; 2) It was originally a (Christian) "feminine first name"; 3) Most importantly, it "signifies joy". Twenty years later, in "Joyce le symptôme I", Lacan similarly emphasises how Joyce's own name is associated with joy, "that is, with *jouissance*" with the "en-joycing which is the only thing one can get from his text". Lacan then concludes: "This is the symptom". Such a symptomatic etymological coincidence could easily account by itself for Lacan's life-long, and equally symptomatic, interest for Joyce; *a fortiori*, it could always be referred to as an authoritative justification for the plethora of studies that have been dedicated to the Irish writer's relationship with psychoanalysis. Limiting oneself to some of the latest appearances on the contemporary Anglophone publishing scene, one should at least recall here issue number 11 of the journal "lacanian ink" (which includes contributions by Jacques-Alain Miller and Slavoj Zizek) (1997); Jean-Michel's Rabaté's "Joyce's *Jouissance*, or a New Literary Symptom" (2001); and the even more recent article "Of Chrematology: Joyce and Money" by Simon Critchley and Tom McCarthy (2003).

The wide-ranging scope of Luke Thurston's engaged Lacanian work on Joyce speaks for itself: he has recently completed an impeccable translation of the voluminous and incredibly detailed *How James Joyce Made His Name* by the Argentine Lacanian analyst Roberto Harari (2002) and will soon publish his own monograph, *Impossible Joyce: Psychoanalysis and Modernism*. Thurston's elegant editing Of *Re-inventing the Symptom--Essays on the Final Lacan* should, as a consequence, be inserted within a broader courageous project. The novelty of this collection primarily lies in the fact that, besides adding yet another contribution to the flourishing catalogue of Lacanian discussions of Joyce, it also aims to address the--hitherto neglected--matter of the reformulations that Lacan introduced into his theory in the Seventies. The last Lacan is usually (and mistakenly) deemed impenetrable; his scientific flirtations with set and knot theory, topology and physics are often precipitously dismissed; in parallel, his enduring interest in literature is generally and misleadingly commented upon in a rhapsodic, semi-possessed and far from convincing way.

Thurston's avowed effort to "reduce the 'anecdotage' of Lacan's final period" should therefore be lauded. Unfortunately, his is an only partially successful attempt. Not only do the articles in the collection display different degrees of accuracy and theoretical consistency, but often they also presuppose conflicting methodological approaches to Lacan's work: whilst some are dedicatedly engaged in an exegetical (which is not to say less creative) reading of the last
Lacan, others prefer to "develop" his theory in an alarmingly facile way. The problem with the latter approach is that by disdainfully bypassing any meticulous interpretation of Lacan's late writings and by formulating highly idiosyncratic notions without informing the reader of the author's departure from the matter at hand, these texts appear to attribute concepts to Lacan's own oeuvre which are, strictly speaking, foreign to it. (This is particularly pertinent with regard to Lichtenberg Ettinger's pseudo-Lacanian formulas of "Subsymbolic", "state of pre-ab-sence", "potential preoedipal baby", etc.) The self-indulgent consequence of these regrettable divinations (which Thurston generously prefers to commend for their "heretical vigour") is an implicit, non-articulated dismissal of some of the most important and --by now--commonly accepted theoretical junctures in the final Lacan--such as the inextricability of the Real and Symbolic orders and the consequent refusal of any form of "primordial" jouissance. No doubt, it would be naïve to suggest that there is a "true" final Lacan who awaits to be "discovered"; no doubt, we should endorse Thurston's awareness that reducing the obscurities of Lacan's final period does not necessarily mean deleting them. But, above all, we should also avoid detecting in Lacan's (astutely manoeuvred and self-conscious) pas-à-lire any form of consent toward "wild interpretation", both textual and clinical. (Lacan's profound aversion for Dostoyevsky's "God is dead; everything is permitted" is too well known, forgetting it is simply not excusable . . . ) On the contrary, we should stress how Lacan's resistance to interpretation is a fundamental component of his theory. This is the paradox that renders the latter so unique. It is therefore important to persevere in a rigorous exegesis of Lacan's work (especially of his final production) precisely in the name of a loving fidelity to Lacan's open oeuvre and of the theoretical respectability that must be accorded to its divulgation. The key notions of the last Lacan (such as sinthome, langue, jouissance, etc.) are anchored in a resistance against sense: however, they are far less elusive--and much more reciprocally systematic--than one may initially suppose. Their resistance against sense is enacted from within sense. If they still seem so elusive this is at least in part due to the complacently elusive character of most of their exegeses.

Lacan's traversal of the fundamental fantasy

One presupposition is tacitly shared by all the essays in this collection, as by its very title: Le sinthome (SXXIII, 1975-1976) is to be considered as the pivotal work of Lacan's final production. In this seminar, Lacan "re-invents the symptom" and consequently re-assesses both his theory and practice by formulating his new notion of the sinthome: this is primarily achieved by analysing the writing of James Joyce. The general question then arises for many of the authors concerned of establishing whether Seminar XXIII constitutes a genuine rupture with Lacan's earlier theory or not. Hoens and Pluth's paper brilliantly avoids the ultimate sterility of such a debate--which can be endlessly applied to any part of Lacan's immensely varied production--by proposing that the sinthome is nothing but a new way of taking into consideration and of giving an answer to an old problem. The old problem is that of the relationship between the Symbolic and its (constitutive) state of exception.
(i.e. the persistence throughout Lacan's work of the necessity to explore the logic of the causative lack or, in Lacanese, of the "non-All"); the new proposal consists in considering the Real as both the point of impasse of the Symbolic and as the latter's conditio sine qua non. (The question of whether one has to wait until Seminar XXIII to see this change at work remains open.) Bluntly put, for the final Lacan, the Real is "internal" to the Symbolic. Supplementing Hoens and Pluth's considerations with Kantian terminology, one could similarly argue that the final Lacan moves from a transcendent notion of the Real to a transcendental one. This passage eliminates any kind of transcendence.

The impossibility of reductively reading Lacan's final torsions in terms of either "continuity" or "rupture" should also shed some light on the reasons underlying the continuous "re-signifierisation" of his theory as a whole. No signifier can be reduced to biunivocally signifying just one given signified: the distance that separates Lacan from Saussure's structural linguistics was enacted, first and foremost, by Lacan himself in his own (re)formulations. Lacan's genius is marked by his incessant work-in-progress, by his capacity to repeatedly resignify some of the most basic notions of his theory (i.e. symptom, Real, Other, objet a, etc.) in different contexts by retroactively mutating earlier significations (without refuting them) and by remodeling them within a new, consistent system. One should notice at this point how the most succinct definition of the traversal of the fundamental fantasy (one of the ways to express the aim of psychoanalytical treatment) might be the following: re-signifierising the Symbolic; re-signifierising the Symbolic by temporarily assuming the Real-of-the-Symbolic, that is, the Symbolic's constitutive lack (or, which is the same, its jouissance). Lacan's continuous reshaping of his theory should thus be considered in the guise of a repeated traversal of his (theoretical) fundamental fantasies: the fundamental assumption of such an operation is the interminability--and not the ineffectiveness--of analysis. After one's fundamental fantasy is traversed a new one emerges: nevertheless, what is progressively--but never fully--achieved is an individuation of lack. In "Joyce le symptôme I", with a symptomatic negation

160

that seems to be taken directly from Freud's case studies, Lacan admits that: "What matters to me is not imitating Finnegans Wake; I would never be up to the original". Is not this slip of the tongue the closest one can get to proving that there also exists a Lacan-le-sinthome? What Lacan ascribes to Joyce's writing clearly overlaps with what Lacan would probably like us to ascribe to Lacanian texts, to the deliberately artificial impenetrability of his Écrits and, above all, later on, to the almost glossolalic invention of neologisms and homophonies which characterises his final production. Lacan's own traversal of the fantasy consists in a continuous re-signifierisation of his theory aimed at resisting academic signification as long as possible: the notion of Joycean sinthome can only be approached appropriately from this premise.

With the exception of Hoens and Pluth's excellent paper (as well as of Harari's and Nobus's contributions which do not directly deal with the sinthome from the perspective of Joycean writing--the former offers the reader a remarkable introduction to the possible conjunctions between the final Lacan and "chaos theory"; the latter primarily focuses on the function of reading and writing as theorised by Lacan in his 1971 article "Lituraterre"), the main problem with the remaining essays appears to lie in the fact that, albeit in different ways, they all treat Joyce as the mere emblem of a movement of separation from the Symbolic. (If this were really the case, the question one should immediately ask oneself would no doubt be the following: why
did Lacan not stick to Antigone and to the apology of tragedy in *Seminar VII*? Why did he feel the need to overcome that period of his teaching?) As a consequence, most of the essays in Thurston's collection tend to relegate the emergence of the *sinthome* to the negative, destructive and "tragic all too tragic" moment of the traversal of the fundamental fantasy. The alleged incompatibility between the Joycean *sinthome* and the necessity for the subject to anchor his unconscious to a (new) fundamental fantasy is most clearly expressed in Dravers' article. Against this stance one should, on the contrary, insist on how Lacan closely associates the emergence of the *sinthome* in Joyce to the issue of the naming of the Real and the marking of *jouissance* (for Lacan, Joyce is indeed "Joyce-le-sinthome"),

that is, to a re-inscription in, and a re-symbolisation of the Symbolic which (at least partially) *individuates* the lack in the Symbolic (for Lacan, Joyce is also "the individual"). If, on the one hand, it is true that Joyce "abolishes the symbol" (i.e. his "subscription to the [existing, hegemonic] Unconscious"), on the other, it is equally the case that the "identification with the *sinthome*" (qua naming of one's Real) advocated by the final Lacan as the aim of analysis--and supposedly attained by the Irish writer *without* having been analysed--could never amount to a psychotic erasure of the Symbolic. In stark contrast with Voruz's clear-cut speculation that "Joyce should be taken as a Lacanian paradigm of psychosis" (and with Verhaeghe and Declercq's overlapping of the *sinthome* with "the [implicitly psychotic] identification of the subject with the object a") one should, on the contrary, underline how:

a) Joyce is--to adopt a formula proposed by Darian Leader--a "non-triggered" psychotic. He is initially "in between" neurosis and psychosis and he subsequently manages to produce a (partially) individualised Symbolic;

b) Neurotics can eventually turn their ideological symptom into a non-psychotic *sinthome* when they undergo the traversal of the fantasy, that is, the moment of separation from the Symbolic and the ensuing process of symbolic re-inscription through a new, individualised Master-Signifier. This also means that, despite not being a psychotic, Joyce does not initially need to traverse his fantasy, as Dravers instead argues. Unlike neurotics, he is *already* separated from the Symbolic; instead, he needs to "create" his founding Master Signifier. As Jacques-Alain Miller puts it in his "Lacan with Joyce --Barcelona Seminar II": ",[Joyce's] authentic Name-of-the-Father is his name as a writer [ . . .] his literary production allows him to relocate himself in the meaning he lacked".

"Le Reel est à chercher du côté du zéro absolu"

The inadequate fashion in which some of the essays contained in *Re-inventing the Symptom* treat the "naming" of the *sinthome*

162

raises a series of objections concerning the way their authors examine other--closely related--topical notions from *Seminar XXIII* (and, more in general, from the work that Lacan dedicates to Joyce in the mid-Seventies). These are more specifically: 1) The relation between the One and
the Other—which overlaps with the already discussed relation between the Real and the Symbolic; 2) The status of lack and the role of jouissance; 3) The economy of the various forms of jouissance, especially of feminine jouissance.

1) Lacan's motto according to which "there is no Other of the [symbolic] Other" dates back to the late Fifties. But it is only in the Seventies that all consequences are drawn from this statement. "There is no Other of the symbolic Other" primarily means that--given that the symbolic Other is not (any longer) legitimized by any Other external guarantor (i.e. the universalised Law of the Name-of-the-Father), and given that the Symbolic is non-All--Real Otherness with respect to the Symbolic is no longer possible. In other words, for the final Lacan, there is no "primordial One" which was originally "killed" by the Symbolic; there is no Pure Real (no "real Real") beyond the dimension of the Real-in-the-Symbolic, that is, of the leftover of the Real which "holes" the Symbolic (in its conjunction with the Imaginary). The Pure Real exclusively belongs to the domain of the mythical or to that of the mathematical (which ultimately overlap). "There is no One but in mathematics", as Lacan stated in 1971. Some of the essays in Re-inventing the Symptom fail to acknowledge this unequivocal negation: this is why the passage from Lacan's reading of Hamlet in Seminar VI to his reading of Joyce in Seminar XXIII can be summarised by Dravers as a passage from the Other to the One; shaming the same assumption, Voruz states that there is a Real "outside" of the Real in language. (Against this stance, in his forthcoming Organs without Bodies, Slavoj Zizek unambiguously claims that "Lacan brings back the cut, the gap, into the One itself"--this One-with-a-gap is to be opposed to both the notion of "One-substance" and to that of "radical Otherness".) To go further, it has to be underlined how, for Lacan, the "primordial One" - or "real Real" - is not-One precisely insofar as, to put it with Alain Badiou, it cannot be effectively "counted as One": it actually corresponds to a zero. (As Harari recalls in his How James Joyce Made His Name, Badiou's philosophy of the real event is deeply indebted to the final Lacan.) In Seminar XXIII, Lacan points out that "the Real must be sought on the side of the absolute zero". We can only retroactively think this 0 from the standpoint of the "fake" symbolic/imaginary One (what Lacan calls a "semblant"): even better, we can retrospectively think this 0 as if it were a One--the One par excellence--only from the standpoint of the "fake" One. To put it differently: 0 is nothing but, as such, it is something from the determinate perspective of the "fake" One: the Thing-in-itself is in-itself No-thing for Lacan (it is, as he says, l'achose). In other words, the 0 equates to the always-already lost mythical jouissance of the real Real: the "fake" One needs the "fake" jouissance of objet a in order to "make One"--To cork the hole in the symbolic structure--and thus retrospectively creates the illusion of an absolute jouissance (or suffering) which has been lost.

2) Ever since Seminar VII, suffering explicitly stands out, for Lacan, as the main characteristic of jouissance. Jouissance is "pleasure in pain". More specifically, this suffering which jouissance is equates to the jouissance of objet a, a leftover, that is, a remainder of the Real which tears holes in the symbolic structure (the Symbolic as such is "holed" in this manner). Objet a qua real hole in the Other is both the hole qua
presence of a surplus-leftover Real (jouissance of "a") and that hole qua absence of the Whole Real (the Thing), that is, qua absence of jouissance. This is a distinction of fundamental importance in order to understand the last Lacan and the way in which he continuously plays with this ambiguity. What does that presence of a real leftover actually consist of? At its purest, the jouissance of "a" qua surplus jouissance (the drive) can only equate to enjoying the lack of enjoyment: there is nothing else to enjoy. (This explains why in L'envers de la

psychanalyse--SXVII, 1969-1970--Lacan can unambiguously state the following: "One can only pretend that there is plus-de-jouir [i.e. jouissance of objet a]; heaps of people are still seized by this idea"). Jouissance is suffering, it is jouis-sans--to use a neologism which, to the best of my knowledge, was not coined by Lacan. Enjoying the lack of enjoyment will therefore mean suffering/enjoying the lack of the Thing, the fact that the Thing is No-thing (l'achose). One of the major tasks of psychoanalysis is to make the subject accept real "a" qua lack: on the contrary, according to Lacan, both perversion and capitalism (pretend to) enjoy real "a" (the lack) qua presence of jouissance. Against this background, statements such as "neurotically, the Name-of-the-Father knots the registers of the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary in a way that jouissance is forbidden" (Verhaeghe and Declercq) as well as notions such as "archaic jouissance" (Lichtenberg Ettinger) and "pure enjoyment" (Voruz) could all be said to point to the fact that many articles in Re-inventing the Symptom rely on the, strictly speaking, perverse assumption that, somewhere "beyond" the Symbolic, there is (more) jouissance. All these authors variously characterise the Joycean sinthome as an "increase" in jouissance and not as a (partial) subjectivisation of the lack that jouis-sans is. If jouissance is jouis-sans, enjoying more or "less" makes sense only from a perverse standpoint which takes for granted the presence of jouissance. On the contrary, there is only one fundamental difference at work here: one can either accept or fail to accept the lack that jouis-sans is. Even in the border-case of psychosis, what is at stake is not an "increase" of jouissance but an incapacity of the Symbolic to manage the potentially destructive lack of jouissance that jouis-sans constitutes.

3) As Voruz correctly affirms in her article, in Seminar XXIII Lacan's discussion of Joyce's sinthome is related to that of three different forms of jouissance. She distinguishes them as: phallic jouissance; jouis-sens; and Other jouissance. I am tempted to re-group them in a slightly different way:

a) Phallic jouissance of objet a in the fundamental fantasy (JΦ). This is the jouissance that allows the subject to "make One" qua singular parlêtre. In other words, this is the jouis-sens which allows us to "make sense" qua barred subjects. Or, to adopt yet another Lacanian writing of the same notion, this is jouis-sens: jouissance (of "a") is not only that which, as it were, necessarily accompanies language yet remains detached from it. Jouissance also emerges in language itself. That is to say, the drive is not unspeakable, it "utters itself in
language in the guise of jouis-sens. Enjoyment (or better, its lack) is also idiotic enjoy-meant. Jouis-sans also indicates a linguistic lack of sense, an intrinsic limitation of symbolic knowledge as such.

b) **Jouissance** of the big Other for/under the hegemony of which we "make One" and "make sense" (i.e. ideological j‘ouï-s-sens which corks the holed structure). The jouissance of the big Other actually equates to phallic jouissance: it is the same jouissance, but considered from a different perspective. That is, the jouissance of the big Other corresponds to ideological phallic jouissance considered, as it were, from the standpoint of structure and not from that of the (alienated) subject who is interpellated by it; phallic jouissance is nothing but this same jouissance taken from the perspective of the alienated subject.

c) Other jouissance (JA), which Lacan famously associates with feminine jouissance in the early Seventies. Other jouissance should definitely not be confused with the jouissance of the big Other (this is why it is misleading to translate the former as "jouissance of the Other"). It is true that in Seminar XX, Other jouissance seems to indicate the pure jouissance of the Real beyond any symbolic contamination ("beyond the phallus"). However, it should be evident by now that such a definition of Other jouissance is highly problematic for any serious attempt to develop a consistent theory out of Lacan's anti-structuralist move. The first versions of the Borromean knot show us precisely where the difficulty (if flot the contradiction) lies: JA (Other--feminine--jouissance) lies outside the ring of the Symbolic, but it is not outside all the rings! In other words, without the ring of the Symbolic it would not be possible to have the Borromean knot (qua topographical representation of the subject-parlêtre) and consequently not even JA . . . The important point to grasp here is that feminine jouissance remains indirectly related/internal to the Symbolic: the feminine non-All is ultimately both different from and dependent on the phallic Symbolic, precisely insofar as it stands as its non-All, its constitutive point of exception . . . Consequently, JA cannot stand for the jouissance of the "real Real", or, in other words, there is no Other jouissance given that there is no Other of the Other. Lacan seems to become aware of this deadlock in Seminar XXIII, in which in fact JA barred takes the place of JA in the Borromean knot. In one of his most important lectures from that year, Lacan states the following: "JA barred concerns jouissance, but not Other jouissance, given that I have stated that there is no Other of the Other, i.e. that there is nothing to be opposed to the Symbolic qua place of the Other; the fact that A is barred entails that there is no Other jouissance in as much as there is no Other of the Other". The passage from the notion of Other jouissance (JA) to that of jouissance of the barred Other (JA barred) epitomizes the fundamental distance that separates Seminar XX from Seminar XXIII, Saint Theresa's holy ecstasy from the (still feminine) individuation of lack carried out by Joyce-le-saint-homme.
In Seminar XXIII, JA (of Woman) becomes impossible: however, feminine jouissance could be re-defined in terms of JA barred, i.e. in terms of the sinthome. (In this way, it would be)

easy to think of Joycean jouissance as a thorough re-elaboration of the jouissance of the mystic which Seminar XX had already paired up with feminine jouissance. It then also becomes clear why Lacan's recurrent parallelism between Joyce and a saint is far from being gratuitous: "Joyce-the-sinthome is homophonous with sanctity". ) JA barred is therefore a (form of) jouissance of the impossibility of JA. Most importantly, one has to underline how the jouissance of the barred Other differs from phallic jouissance without being "beyond" the phallus. Here, Voruz's otherwise accurate description of the three forms of jouissance falls short. She fails to acknowledge that, in Seminar XXIII, jouissance of A barred substitutes the purity of JA as introduced in Seminar XX. The same is valid for Verhaeghe and Declercq's analysis of the "feminine way": if, on the one hand, they correctly conclude that the (Joycean) feminine "entertains a special relationship to the object a and jouissance", on the other, their inference is erroneously deduced from the assumption that the "Other gender" emerges as a consequence of the formation of the subject's "Real identity" intended as a "substantiality". (Lichtenberg Ettinger's rapturous illuminations are far clumsier, even completely missing out the logic of the non-All that defines the Lacanian Symbolic: hinging on an oversimplifying dualism, her article conjectures that a dethronement of the phallic Symbolic would allow the feminine to overcome the sexual non-relation by reconstituting the archaic incestuous mother-infant bond "as an almost-other-Event-Encounter of a not-I that is borderlinked to the I" . . . )

The basic question one must ask is therefore the following: how does the jouissance of the impossibility of Other jouissance, i.e. the jouissance of the barred Other, distinguish itself from phallic jouissance? (Especially considering that the latter is also, in its own way, a form of barred jouissance, of jouis-sans.) Lacan's straightforward answer would be: phallic jouissance "makes One", whereas JA barred "makes the individual"; that is, if phallic jouissance (of objet a) makes One, pretending to obliterate the lack, on the contrary, JA barred (which also enjoys objet a--it suffices to refer to the Borromean knot to prove this; indeed, there is nothing else [not] to enjoy!) makes the individual who, as it were, develops his own

Symbolic from that lack. Joyce is "the individual" for Lacan, that is, Joyce succeeds in subjectivising himself by (partially) individualising objet a: the individual is not the ideological One, it stands for another modality of One, another (non-psychotic) way of inhabiting the Symbolic, "starting" from its real lack.

To conclude, I would like to attempt to answer one of the thought-provoking questions with which Hoens and Pluth end their outstanding paper: "From what point of view can the Name of the Father be seen as identical to the sinthome?". Already in the early Sixties, le Nom-du-Père ceases being exclusively a prohibitive Non-du-Père for Lacan; in fact, in the standard situation of neurosis, it also allows the localisation/regulation through the symptom of an otherwise destructive jouissance, that is to say, its "No!" lets us (ideologically pretend to) enjoy (the lack which now holes the Symbolic). What Lacan seems to further suggest with his later work on Joyce is that, in the case of "non-triggered" psychosis, this same localisation, which allows the
subject to inhabit the social space, can eventually be carried out by the *sinthome* itself. In other words, the pluralisation/relativisation of the Name-of-the-Father which follows the barring of the Other—that is, the emergence of a structural lack—ultimately entails two complementary consequences in what concerns the symptom: on the one hand, the Name-of-the-Father, insofar as it occupies a place which actually lies out of its competence—since the lack belongs to the domain of the Real—can itself be considered as a symptom itself (in *Seminar XXIII*, Lacan states that: "The Oedipus complex, as such, is a symptom. It is to the extent that the Name-of-the-Father is also the Father of all names that everything holds together; this does not make the symptom any less necessary"); on the other, everything else that manages to organise *jouissance*—i.e. symptoms themselves—can eventually carry out the containment action which is usually accomplished by the Name-of-the-Father if the latter does not function properly. Joyce's paternal metaphor was defective: it had to be supplemented by the writer. Thus, the name "Joyce" literally embodies a subjective place-holder for the lack in the Other and it does so by means of a particular way of writing.

169

The name "Joyce" is a "singular universal": Joyce reaches an alternative version of the hegemonic Name-of-the-Father—thus *individualised/individuated* and anti-ideological by definition—precisely by means of writing his *jouis-sens*.

170